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Introduction
Although marketing mix problems for consumer goods producers have
been extensively modeled in the marketing literature, no corresponding
modeling effort has yet taken place for the industrial products case.
Since the customers in the consumer and the industrial products markets
can be expected to differ in several respects, it is clear that models
developed for the former market will not generally be of much use in
the latter case. With industrial marketing coming into focus in recent
years, especially as concerns industrial buyer behavior--for an up-to-
date treatment, see (10) --the groundwork has been laid for a well-
founded modeling of the marketing mix problem facing the industrial
products seller > This paper develops one version of such a marketing
mix model.
In what folic ws the extant theory and empirical findings ^of indus-
trial buyer behavi >r will first be surveyed. On this basis the likely
customer response; ••« •*« available inatrumints will then be developed.
This development will be made more exact by translating the a priori
verbal relationships into mathematical representations incorporating the
essence of the stated relations. The model incorporates both stochastic
and deterministic elements, in that the parameters of the utilized pro-
bability distributions are modeled deterministically. After the general
form of the optimal decision rules are developed for the profit

maximizing case, an example is presented showing a concrete application
of the model.
Some Major Features of Industrial Buying; Behavior
One basic finding in industrial buying research has been that the
purchase decision maker is rarely a single person. Rather, several per-
sons, including a purchasing agent and an engineer and/or user of the
product, will make up a more or less loose group of decision makers
[3,-10]. On the other hand, it has been established that this group
decision making occurs sequentially, rather than simultaneously. Thus,
the final decision to purchase from a deliverer rests usually with the
purchasing agents. Which f irmf/products to consider, however, is to a
large extent determined by the engineers* quality tests and the users 1
experience with the product. A bad experience qualitywise or service-
wise, or simply in terms of delivery days, will generally be communicated
in negative terms to the purchasing agent, sometimes making a repeat
purchase impossible [3].
Accordingly, once a firm's product has been tried, the experiences
with it will tend to dominate in the determination of a possible return
to the same firm. The purchasing agent will still have some leeway,
however. He is basically in charge of identifying new suppliers [3,
11]. Furthermore, when a new product is needed, any of the competing
sellers whose offering fulfills the basic engineering/user requirements
will be eligible. Finally, in many cases the performance of the present
product will be merely "satisfactory" and other firms 1 products might be
tried. The Scientific American study found that whereas the initial
specifications desired from the product were within the purchasing

agent's purview only 77» of the time, he was solely in charge of decid-
ing upon final supplier in 67% of the cases. The basic consideration
in the latter decision between acce table sellers seers to be price
and shipping costs [3].
In identifying potential suppliers, the purchasing agent relies on
past experience, and also on the suppliers' salesmen and advertising.
Although the salesmen clearly would like to have access to all partners
in the purchasing decision group
s
Levitt found that the purchasing
agent functioned as a "filtering" device, prohibiting most salesmen
from ever reaching the engineers and ultimate product users [6j. Simi-
larly, advertising information, in catalogues, direct mail, and trade
journals, tends to reach only the purchasing agent, if any one at all
[6, 11].
Since the agent often is making his decisions under various con-
straints, including time limitations, only a relatively small number of
firms can be contacted for price and shipping costs quotations [ll].
This provides for one possible difference between the personal selling
approach and incomplete personal inLormation, since in the former case
such quotations will be insaediately available. On the other hand the
different kinds of advertising will serve as a cheap means of making
the purchasing agent aware of the supplier. Although no empirical study
has yet been carried out tor the industrial buying case, we know from
the buyer behavior theory that an increase in the evoked set of 8uppliers-
will tend to lead to an increase in search activity [10]. Thus, adver-
tising in any of the forms described might be justified.
The overall quality judgment of a tried product will be a function
of many factors. Apart from actual performance in production, service

requirements and delays, in addition to delivery times and, design ques-
tions, and even the calling salesman's know-how, will be of importance
[6]. Furthermore, the overall rat*->g will rarely depend upon one per-
son's judgment, but both quality control and production engineers will
figure prominently in any composite judgment [10]. In addition, there
is some evidence that word of -mouth communication can be high between
different companies, making it possible for the engineers to form
quality opinions without actually drying out the product [4],
Mode l ing. Imp 1 icat ions
This discussion of Industrial buying behavior should in no way be
regarded as complete. Rather, we have deliberately focused upon those
parts of the theory and empirical findings which most directly gener-
ate an understanding of the possible responses to our supplying firm's
decision variables of price, quality, personal selling, and advertising.
Let us then extract the implications of that discussion for the modeling
of the marketing mix which is of course our main concern in this paper.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that over time the most
important marketing mix variable becomes the quality of the product.
At an introductory stage, the advertising and personal selling efforts
will perhaps pay off by increasing the awareness of the product and
thereby increasing the trial rate, As time goes on, however, these
trials and the word -of-mouth communication generated will gradually
make quality experiences of highest importance.
Second, once quality ratings have been firmly established, a change
in product quality cannot be made easily or, at least, not communicated
to the buyers very easily. Even if a change is made, and advertising

and personal selling employed r o inform the market of it, this commun-
ication will only slowly filter through to the engineers and users
responsible for quality judgpa ,. Accordingly, a change in quality
can for most practi be seen as an introduction of a new
product
.
Third, aftet: qua ;:ings have been used to establish a list of
^eligible" suppliers, the final choice of product will he made on the
basis of price (including si it costs). Again, in the initial
stages j the list might be increased to include as yet untried firms'
products, for example, through the use of advertising or personal sel-
ling. To the extant word -of-mouth communication is functioning, how-
ever, some of these untried products might be deleted on the basis of
reputed low quality.
Fourth, personal selling differs from advertising in the amount of
information yielded and the role in product servicing. On the other
hand, it is questionable whether advertising has any effect which could
not be achieved through the use of salesmen (although it might be a
cheaper way in some cases). Because of the "spillover" effects of per-
sonal selling efforts on qu i
,
it is understandable that
much industrial selling is done men, Conversely, advertis-
ing is of tan seen as a suppo] : the salesman's efforts
[1, Ch 8 s 14, 15]. Accordi , there are re; for defining the per-
sonal sell lag variable a* including a certain proportion of advertising,
and treat personal selling and as one decision variable.
Fifth, the overall judgment of the product quality represents a
summary measure of the prod. ratings on several dimensions. Although
each of these dimensions consltute a decision variable in its own right

(service
s
design, delivery decisions, etc.) for the purposes of the
present model they can all be subsumed under the overall quality deci-
sion variable. The main reason is that the overall quality judgment is
what matters to the buyers, and thus La the ''interesting variable here.
It should be kept in wind iver, thai: there exists a "quality mix 41
problem of positioning the product on the quality dimensions which is
disregarded in this treatment,
Modal Preliminari
In what follows t these considerations will be employed in the deve«
lopment of a model of the effects of the three decision variables
quality, price, and personal selling upon the supplying firm's sales
and profit figures. Before the model can be developed, however, some
specific, assumptions about the industry have to be made.
These assumptions are that:
(A) The. number of customers in the market remains fixed at N
throughout of analysis (no growth in the market).
(E • \ ',od the supplying competitors do not know
each . know the prices quoted in the
pas
(C) The demand Is such that each demand period is clearly dis-
cern ifc ial deman<
(D) No quantity dis< ed
.
The most restrictive - >n is Ly (C). Should (C) be
untenable,, the assumption that only a traction
of the tot.'.: number oi c stow bu i :h time period. If this frac-
tion stays relatively stable over time, the effect would dimply be to
reduce the total market available in any one period. Similarly, there

are fairly easy ways of adapting the r assumptions if t^he condi-
tions in the particular appl lecessitate it,,
First Period Modeling: _Tj todel
Let r' be the ;: in the market. The proba-
iity that Mour** su :eptable supplier list of
u of these customers,, n < N
s
1 d by F(n). In the first period,
this probabi Lity
,
sonal ag effort (SQ)
since word-of-i • nt. Let the probability
that any one of LI buy from us equal op tfhich
depends upon our price (p.). Then the probability of r customers buy-
ing out of xi listings r < n, can be see i .al distribution, and
(1) Prob (r and n) Prob (r/n) x F(n)
1 Po 10
Let the total numbe competito ijual m. The number of cus-
tomers to list our fin be represented as a random variable
with a Po: an of (n), call it X, will in the
absence of personal selling and quality differences between competitors
be equal to $/m, XI
n!
:.
Froffi a knowls I pected sales ; cm can be
calculated. Accordingly ?ill focus on the
explanation of these two parameters.
HI*>i.1u.»..nnJ~J»",;i
*Tnii9 basic model is i co the one presented in
9, pp« 34-35.

First
.?£;/ The Role of Personal Selling ,
When pe il sell: arried out by any of the firms in the
industry, affect is t< ireness &nd the search
ivity by the ;. Accoz the salesmen expenditures will
rai?
,
a constant which measures the average number of
suppliers list 1). Constraints upon the pur-
chasing agent wi reluctant to add new firms to the
list, however, Wl then la not the actual dollars spent on
persons! selling but rather the share relative to competing suppliers.
Hence, with persona] by our firm denoted by SQ and personal
selling by all the competitors together by S
c ,
we have
(3) 7 - NsKx -!SL_
^c '
The relationship between k and the total industry spending has the
cha tistics of an S~: It teaches a saturation level at
m - e
----
i
the number of competitors that do
personal selling. n level is derived from the fact that
at the can
, Listings. The reason for an
initial "threshol te belief chat very low levels of salesmen *s
efforts :• Increase in k--the salesman may not even
get to mee tt, for examp eshold should occur rela-
tively ear, .^moid of Figure 1.

kk.
1.0
Figure 1
One possible expression for the function is
(4)
k - 1
k;™ (so + s
Where o^, the scale factor* and o^, the slope determinant, can be.
determined empirically data on personal selling effort an6 length
of custom • lists.
The function det< .r.g X has the following desirable properties,
easily checked by substituting requisite values:
1. When S • S -.0, X * 0,
2. Whan S„ > 0, 0. X - H (since k-1)
.
When S r X « 0.
4- Our firm att a portion of the increased number of list-
ings which is pr tal to our personal selling "share."
'For a derivation of the characteristics of this function, see
[5]. The observe the number of competitors listed by the cus'
tomera could be generated through our salesmen.
JwThese properties relate to the first period only. Over time,
selling effort will have a diminishing influence as will be seen later
Nevertheless, if no selling effort is made initially by the firm, the
model does predict zero listings.
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First
,
Period. M - g ?_ ,. .Af\ Q... Role of Price
The probability that our firm will make a sale to a customer (ap )
is seen as identical to the prcbabi Lity that our firm charges the
lowest price among the firms listed by this particular customer. As we
know our cotapetit past prices, we can develop a frequency distribu-
tion of price ...ich of Assuming the past prices to be repre-
sentative or" what prices might be charged in the coming period , we can
then compute the probability that • price of ours will be lower
tha n s ante c ompet itor f s
.
Thus, for example, if the frequency distribution of the price of
competitor 1, say, loo in Figure 2, we can compute the probability
of our price p being lower than his as
(5) Prob (po < p x ) - jPo Pidpt .
Frequency
Price
'igure 2
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If a particular customer lists k r firms besides ours, nhe probability
that he will buy from us is equal to the probability that our price is
the lowest among those k'+l firms. Accordingly, if we renumber these
k' competitors 1 through k 1 , the probability of selling to this cus-
tomer is
(6) Prob (!) = Prob (p < p t , t«l, . . ., k»)
m
IP1 Ip2 "*Jpk i PlP2-"Pk'
d?ldP2 ••• dV = ap '
Alternatively, where the competitors listed are hard to identify,
an approximate procedure might do. We can compute the probability dis-
tribution of average price on the basis of historical data, and then
apply this to the average number of competitors listed. This number is
equal to k, and depends upon personal seiling, as we saw in the last
section. Letting p stand for the mean price, we have
(7)
°Po "
( Jpq * ^ '
If the past price data on our compel tors is scanty, a further approx-
imation sometimes useful might be to let
(8) P - fe ,
where p is our own pries distribution. The proportionality constant p
could be assessed as
3 x mean price last period/our price last period.
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Second
,
Period Modelii of (Quality
,
Assume that r number of customers (r < n) bought from our firm last
time, period] The portion of th ers that will list us again is
determined by the quality of oar product relative to that of our compe-
titors. As be advantageous to have an index of product quality
ranging between and i we will first derive such a measure. Then the
precise effect of quality upon customers will be modeled.
To develop a measure of our quality as perceived by the customers,
assume first that the dollars our firm spends on all the quality dimen-
sions amount to qQ « Some, of the quality ratings are not directly due
to expenditures as such (e.g., delivery timing), but can easily be
transformed into such dollar equivalences (this has to be done in many
cases for accounting purposes anyway) . The mean of our competitors'
spending on thi responding dimensions is denoted by q . The overall
rating of our quality will most probably be a function of the ratio
ween q and q . The relationship will not usually be linear, how-
eve tince at the upper limit
...M-. some customers might remain
unp; ided. Thus, the relal tip would take the form exhibited in
ure 3.
_,
0.0 n
o
M
c
ure J
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One function that will correctly represent the curve in Figure. 3
is the following:
-qn / q ..
(9) Q Ea 1.0"*Ha w t M a positive constant, perhaps equal to 1.0,
As can be easily verified, this function goes to zero as our quality
becomes very low relative to average quality, and it approaches one as
our quality becomes pery much better than the average. In other words,
;
—>0, as qG~->0 and Q —^1, as q^'q^ y.
Let the number of purchasers from last period who still list our
£irm equal r^ (r* < r) . The desired relationship between Qc and r.
incorporates the idea of continuously diminishing returns. That is,
the biggest 1. . e to bad quality occurs when the qual-
& really low. quality improves, the marginal gain of additional
becc tadu&l] Thii tunctional relation-
portrayed in Figure 4.
r
l \
r l~"
/
1
,- MnMHMSSMMI
1.0 Q,
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We can i d3ent uhis curve by
(10) ---- -
< Q rt
with K > an unknown constant. 1 len by i ating we get
(11) t
x
- K In Q Q +
with C the constant of integration, vfhen Q * 1, r. = r, so that C
r. The other llm: condition, that the slope of the function becomes
very large as Q approaches ~ero, holds regardless of the value of K
o
{as long as K > 0) . The actua ie of K has to be estimated from
4
data on quality ratings and number of return
3 ^c and Perio d Modeling: The Total Number of Calls
uallty ther function, which we will set forth when
.he total it of listings the firm can expect in the
criod. Bee cd-of-n communication occurs, product
-•riences < tie customer will at times be communicated to other
cust ms, the trot mber of listings that our firm can expect
in the second period comes from three different groups of customers.
tiie group (with oners) who bought last period and who re-
tains us. Another consists of those .aers who have not yet tried
the product but who will because of the reputed quality. A
third group cotnprts* >se customers who have been attracted by our
HAgain, for the y ratings, our own salesman should be able
to generate the necessary observations. As will be seen in the numer-
ical example given lacer, a few of these "free" parameters s such as M
£., will actually be determined (whan ocher parameters are speci-
fied) by the dynamic properties of the model.
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firm's personal s< lg effort. Again 4 as in the first period, once on
the list the probability of purchase is determined by the price.
In modeling the second period \ t the parameter of the Poisson dis-
tribution of n, the number of calls, we have already dealt with the r
customers that bought last time«~r-^ of these will have had positive pro-
duct experiences. Ihe remaining N-r customers are divided into two
groups: those that are affected by the product quality, and those
affected by personal selling. The latter group comprises basically
those customers who have, not received any word-of-mouth communication
about our £irm r s product.
Since a direct measure of the proportions falling into either
group woo Id be difficult to get, the following approximation will be
useful in most cases. We ax aat the amount of word-of-mouth infor-
Lon generated with respect to a product is largely proportional to
the number of purchasers the product has. If so, the proportion of the
LStomers whc d be influenced by quality would be equal to r/N.
Correspondingly, the proportion affected by personal selling would
equal (N-r)/K. These proportions will be denoted b
1
and b2» respectively
(b| 4 b2 1).
As in the first period, the ^r of customers from these two
groups that illy call u is determined by its differen-
tial advantage re : e .tors. The specification follows
• first period rather closel
(12) X, - r, + b
1
(M-r /k(l-He"V%+b2 (]SI-r>k(~~£-~) ,
S -fS c
the subscript on X indicating the time period.
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In this formulation it assumed that chose, customers mainly
Influenced by quality in their choice of what firms to list maintain
the same level of calls as those influenced by personal selling. The
number of customers calling consists of three parts, two of which
depend on how uality and personal selling effort rate relative to
competition. addition we here get the "loyal" r-j customers still
listing us
.
t'th Period Mode ling,;.. How Many Wi ll Return?
When the time periods under consideration are increased above two,
the basic question is how many customers- rwi 11 keep listing us. From
cur preceding modeling we know that once tb ill, p£ice will deter-
mine sales. W vat personal selling and quality together
determine the number of calls. But will long-term loyalties be allowed
to be formed, 111 there be customers who never list us again?
The answer to the loyalty question lies in the quality effect,
la the seco that a portion of l who bought the
first time around didv return (r,) bee: >f relative quality. If we
tow the same mechanism to wc i the third and subsequent periods,
there will . be a r tilifcy development. True,
price will determinant of purchase, but whether or not
a customer wil LI he dependent upon the quality. Thus, in
any tii the t'th, the same high-quality firm will be
listed continuou . Jition to some other firms (if k is
greater than 1). These repeated listings constitute the basic loyalty
phenomenon in the model.
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Turning to the other extreme- -whether some customers w,iil never
repeat a listing--there are two factors to consider. One, as long as
there is at least one sa upplier, a bad experience with one
titans product will probably lead to a maintained elimination of the
listing of that firm- On the other hand, since the salesman will have
some spil lover effects on quality ratings, there would exist some small
cn;iric^. of returning the firm to the list through the salesman's efforts.
To account for both of these factors, the value of b^—which mea-
sures the proportion o. omers influenced by personal selling efforts*
will be subject to the following exponential decline:
(13) b2>t+1 - x <N-r)/N
where r^ denotes the number of customers buying from our firm in period
5
t.. Since b»—-the proportion of customers who are influenced by qual-
ity considerations- aal tc , there will t3ke place an increase
conscious which is equal to the decrease in b~- This
represents the xperiences will lead customers not to
1st us again, and this partici .emulation incorporates as a spec-
ial case the earliei period values of h, and b (in the first
period b-^G, and
On the other hand;, the exponential decline makes b., only reach
aero . oetically, thus prea influence of personal sell-
ing over time. This represents the spillover of selling effort upon
quality. Again, an actual change in quality will have the effect of
This subscript will be suppressed in what follows when no ambi-
ty can arise.
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moving the firm back to period one,, since a change has to be properly
communicated to the customers before quality can really be effective.
The C
o
& t
_
_
S i r_u c.t.ur
6
Our firm's total production costs can be represented as
(14) PC « a* + a*r
,
where a£ represents fixed costs, and ah unit variable costs. These
variable costs are assumed constant throughout the range of operations.
Such an assumption is sometimes unwarranted in real world applications,
but the analytical convenience it. offers here is considerable.
There are also distribution costs which vary depending upon the
customer's geographical location. Since the customer is charged for
these costs (shipment costs)
s
different customers will in general be
faced with different prices from the same firm. Let the price to the
i'th customer be equal to p , , which incorporates the distribution
costs to i. Then the probability that we will sell to i is equal to
the probability that our price is lowest among those competitors listed
by i. For any one of these competitors, say, the j'th,
00
(15) Prob <poi < Pjl) - J f
is the probability that we will "beat* 1 j. Assuming that i lists k.
competitors, the probability of us selling to i can be approximated by
(16) Prob (poi < pki i) - Cjp"olPk ,
dp
k 3
k
i
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where the approximation derives from the fact that the average competi-
tive distribution, p^.* is used. Similarly, we can derive a distribu-
tion for all the n customers iistir us and the different o- 's, i -
l,2,...,n, could be substituted into the expression giving the expected
purchase rate (here correct formula is clearly a Bernoulli trial
with shifting probabilities of success, not a binomial distribution).
As a further approximation, it might be useful to use the average
price distribution, p, of all the m competitors, and then for each
p n j > i = 1,2,..., n, compute the appropriate probability of winning that
customer using an average calling frequency k. This approach would
still amount to a series of Bernoulli trials, with varying probabilities
To derive one average probability of success, cc , which is the formpo
of the earliest formulation, one could then finally compute
I
v-
(17) os * ---
.JL oDPo n 1*1 ^ i
using this approximation in the requisite formula [l].
B.»P..ge t g_d
...
ff_rof i t - - 1 s t Fg rJLpd C a se
In this section an expression for expected profit based on the
preceding modal and cost structure of the firm is presented. From this
expression valt .atal personal selling expenditures and the
optimal price to for given quality expenditures are derived
analytically. From eq(3), the value of X, for the 1st period is given
by
s
X - N x R x [-J2 ]
°oTOc
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From eq(l) and eq(2)
Prob (n listings and r sales) * £L-^ I n \ (£ ) r (1-/ )n
~ r
til \r } F <> P
* Prob (n and r)
Expected number of CL*stociers chat will - B(r)
E(r) ~ t ob (n and r) x r
n^o r
-r
x r
n=c r -o
If each customer is charged price pG , the Expected Sales would be,
(19) S (Sales) * B(r) x o
* o
Total Personal Selling Costs of the Firm in 1st Period - S
Total Quality Expenditures q
Expected Costs of Production a-^ + a 8(r)
where a^ and a are constants, unique to each firm.
(20) Expected Costs - S + q •* a, * sE(r)
From (19) and (20)
Expect; Dfits in Period i E(P), will be a by,
1(P) ** Sxpecte :ed Costs
= 8(r) p - (S + c c v a 1 + a S(r) )
(21) S(P) = E(r) x (Po-a) - (SQ + qQ + a^
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In order to find the optimal values of personal selling expendi-
tures and optimal price we assume that quality expenditures are con-
stant, (As we saw earlier, quality changes would generally be
relatively race and of a discrete nature). The optimal values are
derived treating each period separately. A separate section deals
with the dynamic optimizatic
Optimal Personal Selling, Expenditures
-
-1st Period, Case
The optimal value of Personal Selling Expenditures (S *) will be
a value which satisfies the equation^
dS.
From eq(3) and eq(21):, djE£?i is given by,
(22> &2i m V Y ^^(^xi^aa^*^!":.1.
;.-0
x Nk __i<L__ x l*\ ir Y k.£ V-r r fo -a\-i - o
(S*+Sc)2
' I'/ f
P To.
Jf'M'
The value of S rt* can be found from
(23) zSs—- \ .^±±jsU^±^2 ..nil1
nr-o c
{•)
(
I
/l-o V r(p -a) »
PoJ I Pf^c/
^
oj
1. In what follows, second-order conditions will be assumed fulfilled
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Equation (23) car/not be solved by conventional methods because in the
* k
equation X itself Incorporates SQ . Hence trial and error method has
to be resorted to.
In such an approach first a value of X. is assumed, say, X *
XT 5. Using this value. V)> equation (23) is solved for (S ).1 ' o
This value of (S ) is substituted in equation (3) and we find X from
/
(24) \* - fcR /
s
°+ s
If (X ) calculated from equation (24) is equal to 5, then the derived
value of S is accepted. Otherwise, the newly calculated value (X )
is used In equation (23) to solve for {S c>2 • Again this value of S
k &jsed to calculai )?* ^ this value is different from X , then
the process is repeated. Often only a few iterations will be necessary
k kbefon ivargence occurs and (X )„.* s X . Then the value (S ) „ , isnr-x Q n+1
taken, as the solution to on (23).
iaa 1 _Py Ice,;— 1st Period Case
From equatj 21) and equation (7)
(25) 8(P) i ) } a-t*- rUfpJ- ltfB r(Po..)
r*o
n-r
- (S - q + &1 )
«=» .«* K
an<a . *
Po
J
1*1
«i
Knowing the distribution of p we can evaluate P p* dp". Then the optimal
^o
value of p Is the one which satisfies quation
""*U . o.
dP,
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This equation will involve the exponent r and (n-r) as well as the sum-
mation. Therefore, the easiest method would generally be to use the
equation 3..1°fl % V^,' * q instead of A B (P> _ n ,. n -_-!-.. c „ ._*
^ p
u tU8 B Q OI -"- '
,
'
" s iA> c f to solve for the opti-
cs P dp
mal value of d
.
c
t_
....
Per
X
Do..yase: Sxpresaion for X
the general t iod 3 the effects of both quality and per-
sonal selling are reflected in the expression for \. From equation
(12) the general expression for X can be written as
(26, \t 1 )t + (b lst ) (N-r t-1 ) Kt (1-e
*&$
)
+ o2 ,t> ^-r t~P Kt ^rH^)
^£JSgi^gg£gonai; Selling Sxj>ettditures--t th Period Case
From equation (26) and equation (2)
N n
,*.n-l,„, dE(: r~ x— .!* * B >* . ,(27) ---£*- ) e^t ( . 1)(X )^-Xtn(x*) i
> r«=o
x (b,
"ks"" ! (<%7) omKr f-^
In this case again (S*) is found b trial and error method des-
cribed above.
th
OgJL^S.§JL ?r ice - - 1 Per ioo Ca sg-
From equation (26) and (7)
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m*o r«o '
(28) E(F^
4Ri P=S
JPn P t "
If we know the distribution of p, we can evaluate p dp and the
"Po,t t
V
t
optimal value of p t is the one which satisfies the equationc
< 29 > !i£ki- o.
d Po
s
t
Mu^tiper lod Op tImizat ion
In single period optimization, the optimal values, viz SQ and p
wets derived lor each period separately, without giving consideration
to the effect upon consequent periods. 1 riper iod optimization the
firm allocates its quality expenditures, personal selling expenditures
and detc on its price in such a way so that optimal payoffs are
t only iu the very next period but over a number of periods.
In wh. an is planning for a horizon
fchr roin thi period t. it has available the same
three instruments as before: quality expenditures, personal selling
expenditure
Optimal Quality Bxoenditures
As indicated earlier, it is unlikely that the firm could contin-
uously vary its product quality. It would normally have at its dis-
posal a few discrete a Item, .. Let us assume that at the end of
period t it has three alternatives qol (the present level), qo2> and
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q -<i Once a decision to change is made at time t, the firm would not
change its qua 1 <^ain for a number of periods. It will be assumed
here that it will not change quality expenditures for at least three
periods
.
The basic approach in this metho be to maximize the total
payoff for all the thre . ods considered together rather than max-
imizing each one separately. The general expression for this maximi-
zation is untractable analytic Here we show two simplified
methods of dealing with the problem. In the first method we take SQ
and p. to be constant for - the three periods. In the second method
and po are changed for each period according to the single period
optimization rules of equation (27) and equation (29).
First Simplj od
iiC i i *m i mi ^^m i ii 1 i lulu —Hi i it >- --«'m n m^ i - r • i~
From equation (26) the value of A. is given by
t"T" J.
-V^t+i
(30) \t¥l « (r x ) + (»»i f t*l><*w.l><ll
"rt^ 1"a q<: -<t+l)
b
o t+l^c.t+l
In the first metho.. is cor - >r all three periods at either
o, «.
one of the v and q -• Similarly, S t can take either
of the values SQ^, So2 , and SQ^ and p can have either one of the
To simplify the treal we a.- that keeping the present
level, q x» *s also a decision that holds for three periods or more.
early, one could analyze the situation where the timing of the
iit.y change is important-~such an analysis could be easily carried
out as the present one tor alternative t'
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values viz pi, P ~fi p 3* ri'o maximize profits over all the three
periods, the following procedure will be adopted.
1. Using given values q^ and S ^, the value of X*. - , is deter-M O.L Oi tTi
mined from equation (30) (r
fc
in equation (30) will be the
sales figure for period t).
2. Using the value of p price, from equation (18), (19), and
(21) the expected profits S (?)...« « can be calculated.
r*v*A
, ^ol
3. Updating of b« t+2 ^- £ done by using equation (13), and equa-
tion (30) is used to calculate Jl,„. Since r , - is not known
trr*. t+1
E(r } is used instead of r . Again, the same values of
t-rl fcr .
q^-j and S-. are U3ed for c _ rt and S ,.,„«loi ox o t+2 o,t+2
4. Using the value of pi for price and equation (18), (19) and
(21) the expected profits, E (?),...> , are calculated.
• Z°)r£
.s Ho]
5. Par' (3) and (4) are used a to calculate E (P)«..^ „t+J
» ^o
1
iff of q e periods is given b
off for
,Ql - £ WW(W + 8 (p ) t+2, q0l + B Wt+S.qo!
the s re described above payoffs £or qQ .:, and q « for
&il Lculat g the same values S ^ and p ^ for
Per Expenditures and e)
(32) Payoff for 8 W,,^ * 8 <P>t«,„
o2
+ S (P) t+3,,o2
(33) Payoff for ^ - E <P)t+1>q<>3 + 8 W^w,^, + 8 (P) t+3>qo3
7
Th« umption that instruments can take three values can of
to-. e relaxed
.
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Comparing equations (31), (32), and (33),, the decision can.-be made on
whether the firm should adopt quality expenditures at q ^, q Q 2 > or q ^
level given it Selling Expenditures to be S
c | and price to be
p , for all periods.
' ol
As mentioned earlier there are three options of personal selling
expenditures that a firm cai . Lz S_-i , S „, S „ and there are threer oi, o2 o3
price options via p , , p.« s and p .... This gives rise to 27 possibleO i. o L O$
combination.. Persona Lling Expenditures, Price, and Quality.
Equations (31), (32), and (33) give us the optimal value of q
fc
to be
chosen only te set of these combinations. A firm in a dynamic
situation would need to use the procedure described above to find the
Payoffs over all three periods for each one of these alternatives.
From amongst the alternatives it would choose the one which gives the
highest payoff over all three periods.
Sjir tied ft I
In fchii Personal Selling Expenditures and
price are not taken te ..ant over all three periods but are
.:• iod optimisation rules of equation
the s-eme steps
as those 6<\&c: in. 2."hod .
1. The by using equation
ipecti-
I From these values and using q ,O L
fc lalue of K.,-1 is determined from
Lon (3
Expected r Its in period (t-fl), E J'(F){
: ^-i Q % are calculated
'by using equation (18), (19), and (21).
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m3. The value of bo t+2 *"s ^ er **ve:<* from equation (13) /6quatioi
(27) and equation (29) are used to find the values of pD t+2
and S , , respectively. Again, using q ., for quality expen*
is determined from equation (30).
.nee r\ iovn, E(r
fc
.,) is used.)
4. Sxpected profits in period <,t-f2), fi'(?) t^.9 , are calculated
:ing equation (18), (19), and (21).
5. Pares (3) and (4) mentioned above are again used to calculate
E '<p
>t+3,qol
'
The Payoff for qc^» for all three periods using this method is given
by,
(34) Payoff for %1 - I'CP)^^ + B'(*>t+2,qol + *'<*>t+3,qol
ame procedure can now be used to find Payoffs for c and q .
*o2 o3
< r for qo2 - »'(P)t+1 ,qo2 + '«t«.,o2 + "'<f)t+3 >qoj
Com] and (36), the decision can be made
Lrni she at q ^» ^o^' or ^o3
It is cl at a similar appro.1 aid be used to generate the
St alt ves S n t •' P *.) i given the derivec and p (and0st fc B o,t *S>t ^
apect iterati; ti scheme again comparing the possible
levels of qualit a init carried through for per-
sonal d then return for another iteration, e:
Sue approach could not g s that a true optimum was found, but
would only select the best combination out of the given alternatives.
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Many times thia will clearly suffice considering the contest of much
decision making. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that
these iterations might not com/. nd could be costly. If it is
decided that the single-period solutions for personal selling and price
be used, making the iterations unnecessary, one would possibly save
time and mo Ls ions wi learly be suboptimal from a
dynamic viewpoint. If the first simplified method is used, furthermore,
subsequent price and sell ianges deemed necessary might easily make
a quality change ineffectual.
The final balance between precision and cost will have to be
arrived at for the particular base at hand. Instead of developing addi-
tional analysis at this level of generality, therefore, we will in the
last section giv numerical example to show the calculations Involved
in more detail and to exhibit the form of some actual marketing mixes.
.
Example
is final section a numerical example of the use of the model
evaiua alternative ith respect to price, quality and
z will 1. \ pose is mainly to give a more con-
crete p system over time for alternative
sttinga of uhe tie., n variables. In addition, as wa will see
>
the
uaerical example will allow . . overall system constraints
the parameter values that satisfy these constraints.
The parame ilues e example are displayed in Table 1.
The number of cusl was it 30, a reasonable, figure for any
industrial markets, anc4 the number of suppliers (including "our" firm)
was set equal to 5. It was decided to run the model for four periods,
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and to develop the tasted strategies with three values (constant over
time) on each of the three decision variables: One value above the
industry average* one below, and one equal to the average. This made
for 2 7 alternative strategies to compare.
A few comments on the other parameter choices are in order. It
was assumed that all the firms had some selling so that the saturation
level of k equal' he scale factor £^ was set rather low, however,
so that k did not get to saturation. It was uncovered in the
early runs that when k does get close to saturation, the number of
listings for any one competitor gets close to the total number possible
(hare equal to 30}.. This will, make the Poisson assumption on the num-
ber o rect, since the distribution is affectively trun-
•;t above the mean. This problem can be handled by replacing
e son by another appro: Late distribution, for example, a bino-
1 witb number of customers find p*equal to X/n, when-
be axpi
The pc M (see equation 9) was Initially chosen as
equal to 1.0. When the i the average values on the
lea, lies were higher than one would expect
(for avei is reasonable to expect an
approximately av.. ire). Ac- gly> & was set at 2.184
when the secon ion 12] computed. Since Qq is a
that /er, the equations (10) and
L) ware left with M 1.0
S
and here K was set equal to r, the number
of buyers in Che previous od. These changes made sales come out
lose to the averag i decision variable settings, and they
also eliminated the problem Lng the . number of returning buyers
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r
1
go negative (a less satisfactory resoli of this last problem
would clearly have been to make the function (11) discontinuous at
the value 0.)
The results from the runs are depicted in Tables 2 through 9 which
give the sales (here equal to the number o rtomers buying) cumulative
profit pictures at the end of each of the four periods. Overall, given
that our planning horizon covers these four periods, Table 9 shows that
cumulative profits arc highest for the high price and quality options,
but low selling effort level. This state of affairs seems to be quite
common across many different industrial markets. The sales, as might
be expected, are higher for a lower price, and generally for a higher
selling effort. In the latter instance, however, a noteworthy feature
of the model is that cur high selling efforts will increase search
activity and thus k, the average number of listings, but that with a
high relative price we may lose, customers who discover low-price compe-
titors (see the last row of Table 8 foi ip 1 e of this).
Overall it. is clear that ;d3 quality is the impor-
tant force, frollowe price, whereas selling effort quite quickly
loses its force. (Note that with a one period horizon, the high sell-
ing effort is sup .) The importance of quality derives, of course,
from its dual role as an inducer to tria : rough word-of -mouth com-
munication j and by making customers loyal. It should be noted, however,
that the first period here does nol he introductory period,
since the b-j_ and b2 values were set at 0.6 and 0.4, respectively, in
the initial period (this was done to make the Illustration brief and
yet show the main features of the model).
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The extension of this example to evaluate other, more, complex
strategies is straightforward. Thus, one obvious set of alternatives
would consist of different levels of a gradually diminishing selling
effort over time— if fe 3 another the alternative timings of
an increase in product quality a low relative level. The hope is
that the simple example presented has given the reader a fairly accur-
ate idea about the behavior of the systea; ov*r time for different
levels on the decision variables.
Summary
this paper an industrial marketing mix model incorporating
price, quality, and personal selling decisions has been presented. The
model was developed on the basis of established behavioral knowledge
(both theoretical and empirical) about the industrial markets, and
incorporates Beveral of the major features of such markets. The opti-
vaai decision variable settings were shown to be untractable in the gen-
eral case, although a ;hl Zied one-period optimization was
possible. A numerical example displaying the main features of the
model was developed and used to evaluate some alternative mix strategies
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XABLS 1
Parameter Values for the Numerical Example
Squation
dumber of customers * N * 30
Number of firms « m *
Number of time p horison e T fi 4
dumber • cu firm last period «* r * 6
(Initial value)
Fraction attracted by quality = b^ = 0.6 (initial value)
Fraction attracted by selling effort * b
2
1-b^ 0.4
(initial value)
Saturation level on k, the average number of firms listed by
a customer * k3 - 5
(14) Fixed costs for m «* ai ==25 (in 1000 dollars)
(14) Variable costs for our firm - a2 •* 35 (in actual dollars)
(4) The scale parameter relating k to total selling effort *
tfo " °-°
(4) parameter relating k to total selling effort =
<tx
* 1.100
(10)(il) The cons . ..raining hov many will return *
K - r (initial v
(9) (11) ;onstai elation I quality expenditures and
the quality indc ! * 1.0 or 2,184 (see text)
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